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The Illinois Bell Telephone Company Case
By Percival

F.

Brundage

The recent decision of the supreme court of the United States in
the Illinois Bell Telephone Company case is so important in
respect to much debated depreciation questions for rate purposes
that a resumé should be of interest to all accountants.
Justice Butler in a concurring opinion took the definite position
that straight-line depreciation is not acceptable for rate purposes.
He said: “Amounts sufficient to create a reserve balance that is
the same percentage of total cost of depreciable items as their age
is of their total service life can not be accepted as legitimate addi
tions to operating expenses.”
The opinion of the court delivered by Chief Justice Hughes did
not go so far as this but decided the issue rather upon the particu
lar facts disclosed. After explaining that the company had used
the straight-line method of computing depreciation, “a method
approved by the interstate commerce commission,” the court held
that, “the point is as to the necessity for the annual charges for
depreciation, as made or claimed by the company, in order to
avoid confiscation through the rates in suit. . . . The question
able amounts annually charged to operating expenses for depre
ciation are large enough to destroy any basis for holding that it
has been convincingly shown that the reduction in income
through the rates in suit would produce confiscation.”
In previous decisions, the supreme court has held that the rate
base on which a fair return is to be computed is “the present
value ” and not the original cost of the property used in the service
rendered. In the United Railways & Electric Co. case (280 U. S.
Pur 1930 A), the supreme court sustained the court of appeals of
Maryland in holding that the allowance for annual deprecia
tion should also be based upon “present value.” In the Illinois
Bell Telephone Company case the court holds that the computa
tion of the annual depreciation provision is not independent of the
rate base. Furthermore, after this decision, it is difficult to see
how straight-line depreciation can ever be sustained as a charge to
operating expenses in determining whether a rate is compensatory
or confiscatory. The decision, it is true, was based upon the facts
of the particular case, but a similar relation between the amount
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of accumulated reserves and the observed depreciation for any
company that has been in business for a substantial number of
years would of necessity seem to exist in all cases in which the
straight-line method has been employed. This is of particular
interest in New York state where the public service commission
has recently prescribed straight-line depreciation as an accounting
requirement for all utilities in the state.
The facts of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company case were
briefly as follows. The Illinois commerce commission on August
16, 1923, reduced rates applicable to part of the intrastate busi
ness of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company effective October 1,
1923. In September, 1923, the telephone company obtained an
interlocutory injunction restraining the commission from enforc
ing the rate reduction on the condition that, if the injunction were
dissolved, the company would refund the amounts charged in
excess of the challenged rates. It was the second time that this
case had been before the supreme court, and that court in its deci
sion of April 30, 1934, reversed the decree of the district court, dis
solved the injunction and required the company to refund the
amounts charged in excess of the rates in this suit during the
whole period up to that date, amounting to approximately a mil
lion and a half dollars a year.
The company in presenting its case had endeavored to sustain
two contentions, which the court held to be contradictory, (1)
that the depreciation charge against earnings on a straight-line
basis was no more than was required in order to provide for the
accruing loss of useful value during the period, and (2) that the
property had been maintained in the best possible condition, was
modern in every respect and that “the existing depreciation in the
property, physical and functional, did not exceed 9 per cent. in the
years 1923 to 1928 and 8 per cent. thereafter,” while the deprecia
tion reserve accumulated on the straight-line basis had reached an
amount in excess of 25 per cent. of the cost of the property. Chief
Justice Hughes in dismissing the injunction said: “The company
has had abundant opportunity to establish its contentions. In
seeking to do so, the company has submitted elaborate estimates
and computations, but these have overshot the mark. Proving
too much, they fail of the intended effect.”
The court defines depreciation as follows:
“Broadly speaking, depreciation is the loss, not restored by cur
rent maintenance, which is due to all the factors causing the ulti
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mate retirement of the property. These factors embrace wear
and tear, decay, inadequacy, and obsolescence. Annual depre
ciation is the loss which takes place in a year. In determining
reasonable rates for supplying public service, it is proper to include
in the operating expenses, that is, in the cost of producing service,
an allowance for consumption of capital in order to maintain the
integrity of the investment in the service rendered. The amount
necessary to be provided annually for this purpose is the subject of
estimate and computation. In this instance, the company has
used the ‘straight line’ method of computation, a method ap
proved by the interstate commerce commission.”

The following discussion of the depreciation charge and com
parison of the accumulated balance of the reserve with the ob
served depreciation of the engineer’s estimate is very concise and
constitutes the clearest statement on this point that has appeared
in any court decision.

“Confiscation being the issue, the company had the burden of
making a convincing showing that the amounts it has charged to
operating expenses for depreciation have not been excessive.
That burden is not sustained by proof that its general accounting
system has been correct. The calculations are mathematical but
the predictions underlying them are essentially matters of opin
ion. They proceed from studies of the ‘ behavior of large groups ’
of items. These studies are beset with a host of perplexing prob
lems. Their determination involves the examination of many
variable elements and opportunities for excessive allowances, even
under a correct system of accounting, are always present. The
necessity of checking the results is not questioned. The predic
tions must meet the controlling test of experience.
“In this instance, the evidence of expert computations of the
amounts required for annual allowances does not stand alone. In
striking contrast is the proof of the actual condition of the plant as
maintained—proof which the company strongly emphasizes is
complete and indisputable in its sharp criticism of the amount of
accrued depreciation found by the district court in valuing the
property. The company insists that ‘ the existing depreciation in
the property, physical and functional, does not exceed 9 per cent.
in the years 1923 to 1928 and 8 per cent. thereafter.’ The existing
depreciation as thus asserted by the company, and the amounts it
shows as the depreciation reserve allocated to the intrastate busi
ness in Chicago (taking in each case the average amounts per
year) are as follows:
Existing
Depreciation
“Years
depreciation
reserved
1923.................................... $11,992,000
$26,797,000
1924.......................................
12,865,000
29,316,000
1925.......................................
13,775,000
32,155,000
461
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1926....................................
1927....................................
1928....................................
1929....................................
1930....................................
1931....................................

$14,621,000
15,360,000
16,241,000
15,300,000
15,863,000
15,828,000

$35,572,000
39,352,000
42,769,000
44,515,000
45,829,000
48,362,000”

Too little attention has been given by many utilities heretofore
to the interrelation of the rate base and the depreciation charge.
Telephone companies generally have been willing to compute the
annual depreciation charge on a straight-line basis as approved by
the interstate commerce commission, relying on several supreme
court decisions that the rate of return must be calculated on pres
ent value of the plant and not on original cost less computed de
preciation. The case of the company as summarized by the
supreme court appears to bring out the conflict of bases in a very
direct way, and that court has now definitely indicated that a
company can not eat its cake if it wishes to have it for a con
sumer’s party.
On the one hand is the argument that the depreciation charge is
correct and computed in accordance with the requirements of the
interstate commerce commission. On the other hand is the state
ment that the plant “was not functionally deficient, in any prac
tical sense.” Although the balance of the depreciation reserve
increased between two and three million dollars a year during this
period, the company’s counsel stated that:
“The percentage of depreciation in the various classes of plant
did not vary materially during the period, with the exception of
three classes, namely, central office equipment, private branch
exchanges and booths and special fittings. In the case of central
office equipment, there were large installations of new equipment
in 1929 which had the effect of raising the per cent. condition for
the entire class from 92 per cent. for prior years to 93 per cent. for
1929 and subsequent years. In the case of private branch ex
changes, the percentage condition improved gradually from 88
per cent. in 1923 to 94 per cent. in 1930 due to the large propor
tion of new installations and correspondingly large retirements of
the old. In the case of booths and special fittings, the percentage
condition gradually improved from 78 per cent. in 1923 to 85 per
cent. at the end of the period, in this case also because of abnor
mally large changes of booths at pay stations. These are the
changes which in the main account for the fact that the overall
condition of the plant rose from 91 per cent. for the years 19231928 to 92 per cent. thereafter.”
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In view of the definiteness of the above statements, it is not per
haps surprising that the court held that the burden of proof that
the depreciation charges included in operating expenses were fair
and reasonable had not been sustained.

“In the light of the evidence as to the expenditures for current
maintenance and the proved condition of the property—in the
face of the disparity between the actual extent of depreciation, as
ascertained according to the comprehensive standards used by the
company’s witnesses and the amount of the depreciation reserve
—it cannot be said that the company has established that the
reserve merely represents the consumption of capital in the service
rendered. Rather it appears that the depreciation reserve to a
large extent represents provision for capital additions, over and
above the amount required to cover capital consumption. This
excess in the balance of the reserve account has been built up by
excessive annual allowances for depreciation charged to operating
expenses.”
The court’s reference to maintenance as related to the deprecia
tion charge is also interesting:

“In the process of current maintenance, ‘new parts’ are ‘in
stalled to replace old parts ’ in units of property not retired. Such
‘substitutions or repairs’ are separate from the amounts which
figure in the depreciation reserve. The distinction between ex
penses for current maintenance and depreciation is theoretically
clear. Depreciation is defined as the expense occasioned by the
using up of physical property employed as fixed capital; current
maintenance, as the expense occasioned in keeping the physical
property in the condition required for continued use during its
service life. But it is evident that the distinction is a difficult one
to observe in practice with scientific precision, and that outlays
for maintenance charged to current expenses may involve many
substitutions of new for old parts which tend to keep down the
accrued depreciation.”
As already pointed out, Justice Butler goes even further than
the court in taking a definite position against straight-line depre
ciation. He gives a number of tables and statistics in support of
the court’s decision and then concludes as follows:

“From the foregoing it justly may be inferred that charges
made according to the principle followed by the company create
reserves much in excess of what is needed for maintenance. The
balances carried by the company include large amounts that never
can be used for the purposes for which the reserve was created.
In the long run the amounts thus unnecessarily taken from
revenue will reach about one-half the total cost of all depreciable
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parts of the plant. The only legitimate purpose of the reserve is
to equalize expenditures for maintenance so as to take from the
revenue earned in each year its fair share of the burden. To the
extent that the annual charges include amounts that will not be
required for that purpose, the account misrepresents the cost of
the service.
“The company’s properties constitute a complex and highly
developed instrumentality containing many classes of items that
require renewal from time to time. But, taken as a whole, the
plant must be deemed to be permanent. It never was intended
to be new in all its parts. It would be impossible to make it so.
Expenditures in an attempt to accomplish that would be wasteful.
Amounts sufficient to create a reserve balance that is the same
percentage of total cost of depreciable items as their age is of their
total service life can not be accepted as legitimate additions to
operating expenses. In the absence of proof definitely establish
ing what annual deductions from revenue were necessary for
adequate maintenance of the property, the company is not en
titled to have the rate order set aside as confiscatory.”

If this had been the opinion of the court, the situation today
would at least be clearer than it actually is. However, account
ants must realize too well the necessity of deciding cases as they
arise to have any just cause for complaint at the unwillingness of
the court to go further than deciding the case immediately before it.
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